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Abstract: Electrocardiogram (ECG) based biometrics have proven to be a reliable source of identification. ECG can 
now be measured off-the-person, requiring nothing more than dry electrodes or conductive fabrics to acquire 
a usable ECG signal. However, identification still has a relatively poor performance when using large user 
databases. In this paper we suggest using ECG authentication associated with a smartphone security token in 
order to improve performance and decrease the time required for the recognition. This paper reposts the 
implementation of this technique in a user authentication scenario for a Windows login using normal 
Bluetooth (BT) and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). This paper also uses Intel Edison’s mobility features to 
create a more versatile environment. Results proved our solution to be feasible and present improvements in 
authentication times when compared to a simple ECG identification. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses a problem reported in the 
literature concerning electrocardiogram (ECG) 
authentication. The problem is that it presents a 
significant time delay associated with identification 
performance when using larger databases (Carreiras, et 
al., 2014). We suggest using a smartphone, as security 
token, to improve the performance of the process.  
In this paper we describe the experiments leading 
to the implementation of a multi-factor authentication 
scheme, in a Windows environment, capable of joining 
ECG and mobile-phone security token authentications 
to improve identification efficiency. Also, in order to 
guarantee a battery-friendly scheme we propose and 
test a communication protocol between the smartphone 
and the computer using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Authentication Methods 
User authentication is based on three commonly 
used factors: what you know (passwords), what you 
have (security tokens) and what you are (biometrics) 
(De Zheng, 2011). Biometric automated authentication 
methods have been growing in the last years, 
transferring security to factors which are difficult to 
replicate – such as fingerprint, retina scan or face 
pattern.  
2.2 Electrocardiogram Authenticaton 
ECG information can be used as a biometric 
method. The ECG reading consists of a difference of 
electrical potential between two limbs, and represents 
an external measure of the electrical activity of the 
heart. The intrusiveness of ECG data acquisition can 
be classified as: (1) In-the-person, which means 
implanting devices (e.g. pacemakers) and is highly 
intrusive,; (2) On-the-person, meaning the devices that 
work by being attached to the person; (3) Off-the-
person, which includes devices capable of acquiring 
ECG signals without any preparation, simply by 
maintaining contact for a few seconds with the 
acquisition device. 
One approach to this method is an off-the-person 
approach (Silva, et al., 2013), that collects ECG data 
from the hand (palms and fingers), facilitating large 
scale acquisition of ECG signals. Authors propose a 
solution for ECG acquisition by reading signals on 
hand palms with dry Ag/AgCL (silver chloride) 
electrodes, which are types of reference electrodes 
known for their stability and electrode potential. 
2.3 Smartphone as Token 
Smartphones have been used in authentication 
contexts before. A solution based on a mobile phone is 
suggested in (Tanvi, et al., 2011). This source refers 
hardware cost as a relevant drawback of the traditional 
approach to security tokens (which includes individual 
tokens and authentication server costs) and proposes 
the use of phones as an alternative. 
The authors presented a scheme consisting of: a 
user (trying to gain access to the application), a 
dynamic password generator for each identification 
process, a SMS server, responsible for sending 
dynamic passwords to the user, and a “Visitor 
password Register” (VPR), temporarily registering 
session’s username and password. Also, these authors 
suggest using the IMSI (International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity) number to strengthen the 
authentication.  
This paper also refers an extension of this approach 
to Bluetooth, labeled “Laptop-user Authentication 
Based Mobile phone” (LABM) (Abdelhameed, et al., 
2005), suggesting a java solution for laptop user 
authentication focused on proximity-based login. This 
work consists of a scheme for authenticating an 
individual by approaching the computer with a 
Bluetooth-enabled phone. This device acts as an 
authentication token, by continuously communicating 
with the laptop through a wireless link.  
2. 4 Custom Authentication in 
Windows 
Windows 7 and later use Credential Providers (CP) 
to manage credentials input. This architecture replaces 
the old GINA (Graphical Authentication and 
Identification) present in previous versions. These CPs 
result in alternative logon tiles that may or may not 
refer to the same user account, meaning that one user 
may have several distinct logon methods through a 
number of different logon tiles. The new approach 
taken by Microsoft, however, won’t allow a full 
replacement of logon UI (Microsoft, 2013). Tiles are 
processed by the logon UI. It requests all credential 
types provided by each CP and displays them. One CP 
may have more than one associated tile, and can 
specify one of them as default. 
Windows authentication system can also be 
managed through pGina (Wolff, 2014). This tool 
replaces the default credential provider (CP) used by 
Windows Vista and later (XP and above used the 
GINA framework instead). It is a plugin-ready, open 
source, application that allows an end user to manage 
his own way of logging into Windows. 
A typical logon (Figure 1) involves the following 
process: 1) user providing credentials to pGina using 
its GUI or any other credential provider; 2) pGina’s CP 
sends credentials to pGina service; 3) pGina service 
sends the logon attempt result (Boolean answer along 
with the credentials) to pGina’s CP after being 
processed by the installed plugins; 4) if the logon 
attempt returns true, pGina sends credentials to 
Windows and the latter performs logon. 
 
Figure 1: Diagram showing the main pGina systems 
interacting in a common logon,  adapted from (Wolff, 
2014). 
2.5 Intel Edison 
Intel Edison consists of a small board 
(35.5x25.0x3.9 mm) capable of running a Linux 
environment (Intel, 2015) 
This board opens a wide range of opportunities 
related with the Internet of Things. In this paper we 
develop a custom authentication system in Windows; 
however, Edison opens a number of alternatives. The 
dual-core CPU provides significant processing power, 
and the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Low Energy adapters 
provide low power consuming connectivity. 
Edison was already used in several different 
applications. For example, Jimmy, a humanoid 
prototype based on Edison. It is an 18 inches tall robot, 
3D printable (Landau, 2015). Their creators, Trossen 
Robotics, intend to make it work in a similar way to 
smartphones – install an app, and make it capable of 
doing more activities. 
3 IMPLEMENTATION 
We intended to implement a scheme where a 
Windows Phone would send its owner’s identification 
through Bluetooth Low Energy when within a certain 
range of a computer. This computer would advertise a 
Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) server, which would 
be accessed and wrote into by the phone, and would 
have an ECG keyboard plugged in. 
However, implementing a GATT advertisement in 
Windows has proven to be a limitation, as it only 
provides APIs to act as a GATT client (Social.msdn, 
2013). Given this hurdle, we decided to implement a 
similar scheme using classic Bluetooth. Afterwards, 
we also implemented a solution using BLE, with a 
Linux system acting as a connection enabler between a 
BLE device and a Windows computer. 
3.1 Classic Bluetooth Communication 
Initially, we created an example plugin for pGina. 
This plugin was written in C# and intended to enable a 
Bluetooth interaction resulting in a successful logon. 
We used a laptop with a Bluetooth 4.0 Dual Mode 
dongle and a Windows tablet with Bluetooth 4.0. This 
implementation was based on the 32feet.net Bluetooth 
(32feet.NET, 2012). 
In this preliminary version, we implemented the 
authentication stage of pGina only, starting with a 
Bluetooth interaction. We experienced problems 
implementing a Bluetooth connection between 32feet 
and Windows Phone API, so we were constrained to 
use Bluetooth scan to get nearby MAC addresses, even 
without establishing a connection. In this version we 
verify user identity through the MAC address 
associated to the users’ mobile device. This 
verification only discovers devices, and has no other 
interaction. Other unique identifiers were used 
previously, such as IMSI (International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity), consisting of the ID associated to 
a SIM card (Tanvi, et al., 2011).  
It is relevant to mention that, although the security 
of such solution is low, this solution is fast as requires 
no specific operating system on the mobile phone. In 
fact, any discoverable Bluetooth device would work, 
and requires no previous pairing.  
Initially, we implemented a solution that would 
trigger Bluetooth discovery when the user attempted 
logon through regular Windows GUI by clicking a 
button on logon interface, with both username and 
password fields hidden (configured in pGina). pGina 
did not offer any solution to completely automate this 
process at the time, i.e., skip the button pressing. This 
proved to slow down the process, requiring around 10s 
to return the result in an environment containing three 
discoverable devices. A significantly higher number of 
devices could expand this time frame (Chakraborty, et 
al., 2008).  
Afterwards, we started developing a Windows 
Phone (WP) 8.1 app for Lumia 530 that connected to a 
Windows desktop application server using 
32feet.NET. The connection was established using 
classic Bluetooth instead of Bluetooth Low Energy 
(BLE) due to the, previously mentioned, lack of APIs 
to perform discovery and pairing with BLE in 
Windows environment (Social.msdn, 2015). This time 
we achieved the goal of connecting both devices and 
communicating strings between them, allowing us to 
build a prototype of Bluetooth-based login. This 
prototype consisted of a WP app that, by pressing a 
button, would send a string message (unencrypted) to 
the desktop server. The server side –which was a pGina 
plugin also managing a BL connection – would then 
release the hardcoded user credentials to Windows 
when asked for. This prototype was a significant 
increase in performance when compared to the time it 
would take to detect user presence/absence in the first 
scenario. However, this solution requires user 
interaction. Also, the connection was not reliable – it 
would randomly connect, or throw an exception. 
Similar problems were reported by other developers 
(Social.msdn, 2015). 
 
Figure 2: Communication scheme: 1) process is started by 
interacting with WP app; 2) pGina processes username; 4) 
ECG is read; 5) logon is successful/unsuccessful). 
In order to avoid requiring user interaction with 
mobile phone to perform login, we tried to execute the 
connection as a background task. Additionally, while 
trying to solve the unstable connection, we concluded 
that the exact same code would work every time when 
compiled to WP8.0, but was unstable when compiled 
to WP8.1, as was also reported in (Social.msdn, 
2015).The use of an external Bluetooth trigger (for 
example, the presence of a Bluetooth server nearby) in 
Windows Phone was, however, only available in 8.1 
version at the time. This conflict forced us to choose 
connection stability over functionality. Therefore, the 
use of a background task was not further considered 
and we backtracked to WP8.0. 
Figure 2 refers to the communication scheme in 
which this scenario was based. The main actors are: 
Windows Phone, the pGina plugin working as BL 
connection point, a database storing credentials 
information and the ECG authentication accessed 
using API. In 1, the WP app would send a message to 
our server containing the username; in A, pGina 
confirms the username with a database (2). A feedback 
might be implemented, although we considered at this 
point it would unnecessarily increase the process 
complexity (3.1 and 5.1). Action is suspended before 
4, while waiting for Windows logon; then, if ECG 
authentication is successful (5), pGina allows logon 
and, possibly, returns feedback to WP. 
We also considered sending Bluetooth MAC 
address from WP to pGina, in order to confirm the 
identity of the phone itself – but WP will only allow 
BL communication in-app with previously paired 
devices, meaning no unpaired device could connect 
with the server. 
We chose to give the initiative of the 
communication to WP and store all passwords in a 
computer located database because: 1) the necessity of 
asking for an explicit user interaction ruled out the 
initiative being on server side; 2) in order to avoid 
sending full credentials (user and password) through 
Bluetooth we decided to store passwords on the server 
side, and then identify the smartphone based on 
username received and associated Bluetooth address, 
both previously stored as well. 
This solution worked by receiving a one-time 
logon message from WP, which the server would 
register with a timestamp and use in future logons 
based on proximity. The process is the following: 1), 
user is approaching the computer and sending the 
logon message via Bluetooth. Then, the server 
recognizes the phone as one authorized to logon in the 
following hours (or any other predefined time range); 
2) when no phone can be found nearby, logon is 
denied; in 3) when the phone is again present, a logon 
with the credentials associated to that user is allowed. 
This means that, starting from 1), the computer itself 
will search for the presence of the authorized phone; 
the search will not require establishing a connection. 
In fact, this search is different from the one stated 
in the first scenario. Previously, we scanned for all 
devices nearby and then verified the identity of each 
one in search of a particular phone; with this new 
approach, we tested the presence of a specific device 
using a pre-stored address. In terms of time required, a 
loop testing for a list of one phone changed logon status 
in less than 2 seconds after turning off Bluetooth in 
WP. 
After implementing the Bluetooth side, we 
approached the introduction of the ECG-reader 
keyboard on the existing scheme. To better understand 
the advantage of using a smartphone combined with an 
ECG authentication, one must explain the latter. This 
method works by first identifying a heart beat and then 
authenticating the individual. Both processes can take 
several seconds, thus leading to a delay in logon 
process. Also, the authentication itself can be based on 
different confidence levels. These two characteristics 
bring a relevant improvement related to the use of a 
smartphone as token – the computer is able to receive 
the identification of the individual beforehand, 
skipping the identification process and also being able 
to use a better confidence level. The keyboard does its 
own autonomous processing. It requires installing 
VitalidiType (Technologies, 2015), the software that 
allows interaction with the keyboard. The interaction 
between the pGina plugin and this system is made 
using its C# APIs, vitalidiAPI. 
The ECG reader is the final step in our entire logon 
scheme, taking advantage of the previously sent 
information from the individual’s mobile phone.  
In summary, the whole sequence is: 1), an 
individual gets in the area covered by a Bluetooth 
scanner in the computer; 2) this proximity triggers a 
process of getting the ECG authentication username 
associated with the detected mobile phone ready for 
authentication; 3) a person attempts logon and the 
keyboard uses the previously received username to 
start authentication, reading the users’s heartbeat; 4) 
the user is granted access if both authentications are 
consistent with each other and succeeded. 
3.2 Bluetooth Low Energy 
As a solution to the GATT server role limitation in 
Windows, we decided to implement a “middle point” 
between the smartphone and Windows desktop. This 
system was running Linux and, therefore, capable of 
advertising a GATT service. In this scenario we also 
changed from Windows Phone to Android to avoid 
more limitations associated with their APIs. 
The Linux system was capable of using BLE 
through BlueZ, which provides support for this 
technology. Also, in order to keep this a mobile, more 
versatile and independent point, we used Intel Edison. 
This board allowed us to create a GATT server, 
listening for BLE messages from a smartphone, and 
redirect them to our adapted pGina plugin running in a 
Windows computer through Wi-Fi. 
All the following scenarios maintain the working 
scheme associated to the keyboard, i.e., ECG keyboard 
expects a contact (hands on keyboard) after pGina 
plugin acknowledges the presence of a valid 
smartphone token. They are an improvement from the 
classic Bluetooth scheme as Android API 19 (KitKat) 
allowed to read the RSSI (Received Signal Strength 
Indication) value associated with a BL signal. 
Although several studies indicate that RSSI is not an 
exact measure of device proximity, it may suggest the 
distance if carefully handled (Parameswaran, et al., 
2009), (Al Alawi, 2011). Also, our scheme is not 
dependent on an exact read of distance, but only in a 
definition of “proximity”. In order to understand the 
variation in RSSI values depending on distance, we 
executed a series of tests (see section Tests). 
First, we started developing a GATT server in 
Edison’s Linux. This scheme worked by advertising a 
GATT service, and the provided characteristic could 
be written by a BLE peripheral (an Android phone 
specifically). The first issue we found when 
implementing a similar message system to the one 
previously implemented in our classic Bluetooth 
scheme was the message size limit of 20 bytes (Gomez, 
et al., 2012). This would prove impossible to send both 
username and password in most cases. So, we created 
a third username, associated with the pair Windows 
username/ECG username, represented by a smaller 
string. Also, we eliminated any overhead associated 
with the messages, being “login”, “logout” or 
“register”, because: 1) register is now a process started 
in the pGina plugin configuration dialog; 2) this 
scheme is proximity-based, thus requiring no “log 
out”, the device is either present or absent.  
After the message is received on Edison (meaning 
the GATT characteristic is written), it is forwarded to 
the pGina plugin via Wi-Fi, and from there it is treated 
as it would in the Bluetooth classic method. Notice that 
this message is only sent by the phone if it is within the 
RSSI margin predefined, so this validation was already 
done by the phone itself. 
 
Figure 3: The phone subscribes a GATT characteristic 
advertised by Edison and, when notified, writes a 
characteristic. After the message is forwarded to pGina, 
user should start ECG authentication by clicking the arrow 
button on Windows GUI. 
Referring to the implementation on Android, we 
changed the initiative of the communication from the 
phone to the server side. Also, we used a partial device 
MAC address (excluding two characters due to the 
limitation of 20 bytes per message. This new scenario 
requires a one-time subscribe to a GATT 
characteristic. After this, the timer implemented on 
Edison associated to the characteristic notifies the 
subscribed phone within a certain time interval (2 
seconds in this prototype). Each time a phone receives 
this notification, it replies with its RSSI and partial 
MAC address. An attempt to use the accelerometer to 
detect user’s (in)activity was not. 
4 TESTS 
4.1 Signal Strength Reliability 
Given the uncertainty about how reliable could 
RSSI be for detecting proximity, we performed the test 
whose results are shown in Table 1. 




30cm 1M 2M 3M 4M 5M 
Best -27 -42 -47 -52 -54 -55 
Worst -43 -49 -52 -56 -59 -60 





The tests with the mobile phone as the single 
Bluetooth device in our environment; the phone was 
placed in the referred distances, with no obstacles 
between it and the Bluetooth scanner connected to a 
laptop. The adapter was a CSR851 (CSR, 2015) and 
the phone was a Wiko Darkmoon (Wiko, 2015). 
Higher RSSI values mean better signal. We obtained 
10 readings with 1s interval for each distance. 
Analyzing the results, we can see a decrease in 
average, minimum and maximum values of RSSI with 
the increase of distance between both devices. Also, 
the clearest difference in RSSI values is seen when the 
distance varies the least – when we step from 30 
centimeters to 1 meter. However, 30 centimeters is the 
situation where the phone is actually in a similar 
distance to the one where a person carrying it 
approaches his computer. These results provide a more 
substantiated way of defining a threshold value for 
phone detection and logon authorization. 
For implementation purposes, we defined a 
threshold of -49dB. Even in a situation of random 
minimum peaks where a phone is incorrectly detected 
as being out of proximity, the consequence is likely to 
be obfuscated by the loop timer of RSSI reading – the 
value is so often retrieved that a single value is not 
likely to impact a common interaction with the system 
4.2 Bluetooth Performance 
We also conducted a series of tests aiming to 
analyze the performance of both classic Bluetooth and 
Bluetooth Low Energy scenarios, in terms of battery 
and reliability. All tests were executed using a Wiko 
Darkmoon Android phone – the Windows Phone 
scenario was tested in Android by tweaking the server 
side implementation, in order not to require a login 
message and just detect the pre-stored MAC address 
associated to the phone (as mentioned before, this 
scenario did not require an app being in execution). 
The phone was put in airplane mode, only with 
Bluetooth on. It was 100% charged for each test, and 
standing still about 30cm from the laptop. For 
comparison, we tested the phone in airplane mode, 
with Bluetooth and apps off and concluded that in 1 
hour, 0% battery is lost.  
We tested for the following parameters (Figure 4): 
Phone battery drain in-range; phone battery drain off-
range; pGina false negative (not detecting an in-range 
phone). Regarding in-range performances, we can 
conclude is that the classic Bluetooth scenario was less 
battery efficient than all other scenarios. Although in 
this scenario the phone is supposedly passive - 
meaning no app is working and it is only detected by 
the server’s BL scan – these results may indicate that 
the scan actually involves waking the scanned 
peripherals, and doing some work associated with the 
Bluetooth scan itself. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of battery loss in each scenario. 
Off-range results show us that the battery 
performance is better in the classic Bluetooth and 
server based BLE scenario. This is explained by the 
fact that in both scenarios the phone is not required to 
be awake – in the BL scenario, the phone is passive and 
no server is scanning; in the BLE scen7ario, the phone 
only replies when contacted by server’s notifications. 
On the other two scenarios, the app is attempting 
connection in a loop, explaining battery usage. 
In another test we measure the difficulty in detecting 
the phone when in range (false negatives). In the BL 
scenario there are no false negatives because it is not 
using RSSI values. This has a down-side, the fact that 
a phone is considered near even if its several meters 
away. In BLE scenarios, on the other hand, a phone is 
only considered in-range if the RSSI reads -49dB or 
better. So, there is a tradeoff between distance 
detection and false negatives. Tests showed a minor 
(0,416%) false negative rate. 
Although we could consider the number of false 
negatives excessive, one must consider the fact that the 
position is updated every second, sometimes more (or 
even less) due to connection inconstancies (both in 
Bluetooth and Wi-fi). This means that these results are 
not likely to affect user interaction. Also, by analyzing 
the logs we concluded that they are sorted in long 
moments of correct readings and short moments of 
incorrect readings (thus showing peaks of bad readings 
and, most of the time, stable correct readings). 
Additionally, we used a value for RSSI threshold (-
49db) that requires close proximity to the computer, 
leading to the possibility of more false negatives. 
4.3 Token/ECG vs ECG only 
comparison 
In order to better understand the delay associated 
with identifying vs authenticating a person we ran a 
(necessarily) limited number of tests to confirm the 
conclusions of previous studies published in 
(Carreiras, et al., 2014). This study shows an increase 
in identification delay and decrease in accuracy when 
the number of subjects in database increases.  
We executed two series of tests. In the first series 
(Table 2), we tested ECG identification (the classical 
ECG-based authentication scenario) and ECG 
authentication (the scenario we suggest, where the 
individual’s identity is previously known and the ECG 
confirms it) times with an 8 user ECG database; in the 
second series (Table 3), we tested the same with a 68 
user database. Both tests were performed with a group 
of five persons (an arbitrary small number, to simplify 
the tests). The smaller database was generated by 
measuring and registering the volunteers ECG; the 
bigger database was provided by the authors’ of 
(Carreiras, et al., 2014) complemented by the five 
testing individuals of the smaller data-base. 
It is relevant to mention that all times include the 
ECG acquisition. Vitalidi collects eight heartbeats, 
therefore an increased heartbeat will result in a faster 
read, and a slow heartbeat will originate longer times. 
For the tested individual – five young healthy males – 
a 60 beats per minute heart rate is considered the 
average (Malina, et al., 2004). Consequently, we 
assumed an average value of 8 seconds in acquisition 
time, and subtracted the original values to create the 
following chart.  
Results confirm the advantage of using a 
smartphone as a security token in an ECG 
authentication context. Identification is unnecessary, 













database is avoided. Instead, the readings can be 
compared to a single, previously known, individual’s 
registered ECG. 
Table 2: Identification and authentication times using an 
8 user ECG database (in seconds). 
Individual Identification Authentication 
1 9,51 9,33 
2 9,76 9,59 
3 9,32 9,23 
4 9,75 9,60 
5 9,80 9,49 
 
In a more safety demanding environment, false 
negatives would be preferable to false positives; on the 
other hand, a less demanding approach opens the door 
for more false positives if that would increase the 
overall performance. With this logic in mind, the fact 
that the system knows the person’s identity before 
ECG authentication allows it to have a better 
confidence level, possibly allowing more false 
positives to increase overall performance. In other 
words, our solution offers the possibility of regulating 
the threshold point. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed the use of a second 
element in ECG-based authentication. We tested the 
techniques in a Windows login scenario, introducing 
an unconventional multi-factor authentication in an 
everyday system. Our suggestion consists mainly of an 
approach using an Android phone and an ECG reader 
keyboard. In this scheme, we took advantage of 
Bluetooth Low Energy technology, now emerging in 
the commercial scene mostly with peripherals, in order 
to take a more battery-friendly approach. As a part of 
our work, we also suggested the use of classic 
Bluetooth in a Windows-Windows Phone scheme. In 
both schemes, our system is capable of working in a 
single-factor mode (using the phone only), or in a 
multi-factor mode (using the phone and the ECG 
keyboard). 
Table 3: Identification and authentication times using an 
68 user ECG database (in seconds). 
Individual Identification Authentication 
1 12,83 9,12 
2 12,54 9,86 
3 11,33 9,54 
4 12,87 9,89 
5 12,20 9,14 
 
In the classic Bluetooth approach, we struggled 
with a number of limitations associated with Windows 
environments – both in desktop Windows and 
Windows Phone. Although we created a working 
prototype in this context, it did not correspond to our 
expectations, leading us to a different approach. 
 
Figure 5: Identification vs. Authentication times, in 
seconds, referring to the five tested individuals, using a 68 
user DB. Comparison between a typical ECG 
authentication with our multi-factor approach. 
In the Bluetooth Low Energy approach, we used 
mostly Linux on an Edison board which allowed us to 
create a BLE server and test the scenario we initially 
intended. Also, the use of Edison proves that this 
approach is feasible for small embedded devices. In 
this case Edison functioned as a middle worker, 
forwarding BLE messages from the phone through Wi-
Fi to a computer running pGina. Also, Android 
allowed us to work with more stable Low Energy 
connections. The BLE approach allowed us to read 
RSSI, giving us a hint of how close the phone actually 
was from the computer. This gave us the opportunity 
to be stricter concerning the individual’s proximity, 
thus denying the identification if the person is in the 
room but not in front of the computer. 
We also analyzed, although limited by the number 
of tests performed, the improvement in authentication 
performance comparing to identification based on 
ECG readings alone. We went from a situation where 
one had to be identified and authenticated (adding the 
delay associated to each), to a situation where the 
system is previously informed about user’s foressen 
identity, requiring the authentication delay only. This 
translated in faster authentication, as well as decreased 
identification error rates. 
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